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Introduction
The object of this article is to investigate the effects of
US fiscal and monetary shocks on the world economy
within a world macroeconomic model.
US policies over the past five years have been the
object of admiration and vilification, exposition and
caricature, both in the US itself and perhaps even more
so in Europe. Some have argued that tight money and
high deficits would not affect real interest rates or
anything much except the rate of inflation and private
saving. Others have argued that they would make
recovery impossible by driving real interest rates to
unheard of levels. Yet others have argued that the high
deficits have stimulated the world economy in a
'locomotive' manner. Established forecasters'
reputations have been dented while some outsiders in
the US forecasting game have scored hits (notably,
recently, monetarists and supply siders). Confusion
reigns supreme, even over the ground rules of this
discussion. The one common factor is the passionate
intensity with which all views are held; the
combination of Ronald Reagan and Paul Volcker has
fired passions across the intellectual and political
spectrum (and probably raised significantly the price
of economists' services - it's an ill wind .
.
It is my contention that the effects of US policies
cannot be understood in a US context alone; a closed-
economy model will not do. I will be arguing that
'crowding out' is occurring on a world scale and that
the 'injured parties' are outside the US in the main;
furthermore, the scale of financing required for the US
deficit has only been feasible through the worldcapital
market.
This points to an understanding of a linked economic
system. How could this be achieved? Some espouse
methods which locate the sources of world business
cycle shocks and the nature of their persistence
This article draws on a longer paper of the same title, on which-I
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empirically without the specification of a structural
model.2 By its nature this type of work - while it has
valuable uses - cannot identify structural relation-
ships; therefore, one cannot easily interpret the results
in terms of casual mechanisms.
One method of explanation appears to be available.
One can set out a causal (or 'structural') system
purporting to describe the linked economies; one can
ask what effects this indicates for US policies and then
check whether that set of effects appears broadly to
have occurred in fact. This is the method I adopt in this
paper.
In brief, I shall be using a description which relies
importantly on two key features - rational
expectations3 and wealth effects of government
bonds.4 This description is parameterised (specified
empirically), as far as possible, using estimates of post-
war behaviour (some re-estimates of our own, some a
priori impositions, some previous work). The
2 See Saidi and Huber [1983], who use vector-autoregressive
methods. The standard econometric approach to model building
proceeds by building a structural model and empirically testing for
its statistical significance. The vector-autoregressive method seeks
to identify empirically the lag structure of economic variables as
they move through time without specifying the structure of the
model [eds].
Rational expectations are based on the assumption that all
economic agents formulate their expectations about future
economic behaviour rationally. This information is utilised in the
most efficient way possible, being incorporated into a model of the
economy which is believed to describe accurately the way in which
the economy operates. The most stark conclusion of the rational
expectations hypothesis is that governments are unable to pursue
effective counter-cyclical macroeconomic stabilisation policies as
suggested by Keynes. For an accessible Keynesian introduction to
rational expectations, see Shaw [1984]. Rational expectations are
made operational in this paper through the assumption that the
model's forecasts are the expectations [eds].
Wealth effects arise from the effects which changes in the net wealth
of economic agents may have on consumption, savings and
investment decisions. Thus, if a fall in the rate of interest leads to a
rise in the price of government bonds, and if this is regarded as an
increase in net wealth by government bond holders, then such
agents may increase, for example, consumption expenditure out of
current income [eds].
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description yields a clear 'story' of the effects of
monetary shocks and (bond-financed) fiscal shocks; in
spite of the 'largeness' of the model, because the model
is constructed according to a very clear set of
theoretical restrictions and it can therefore be simply
understood - the number of equations is not a
measure of intellectual complexity. Finally, I shall
argue that the story fits the recent five-year episode
rather plausibly, reconciling many of the details whose
coincidence has appeared so baffling to different
schools of interpretation.
Before going any further, a brief defence of the two
main features would be wise. Rational expectations I
regard as the analogue of routinely-assumed optimising
behaviour in the information field, it is an 'as-if'
assumption with the same status as the 'profit-
maximising' or 'utility-maximising' assumptions we
make about firms and consumers. lt yields strong
predictions and we have good reason to believe that
competitive pressures exist in the real world driving
people towards this norm of behaviour.
Wealth effects of government bonds have been
carefully analysed by Barro [1974], to whom is due the
revival among economists of the Ricardian equivalence
theorem.5 As Barro notes, there are two main reasons
why bonds could be net wealth to rational agents. The
first occurs if the agent leaves no bequest. The second
occurs if the income tax system is progressive in effect
insuring against income shocks; in this case higher
future taxes will fall more on those with income good
fortune than on the unlucky, and risk-averse agents
will discount the tax stream to below the present value
of the bonds. Empirical work to date has tended to
support the view that bonds are net wealth (but not
100 per cent net wealth) in line with these two aspects.
These points are discussed further in Minford and Peel
[1983].
I now proceed to describe the model and so the nature
of my explanation of recent events. Then I discuss the
simulations of US policy. Finally, I review recent
events and draw some tentative policy implications.
The Liverpool International Transmission
Model
The model is macroeconomic in the sense that it has no
'supply-side' at this stage, the equilibrium (or
'natural') values of output, real interest rates, real
exchange rates, etc., are taken as exogenous.
The Ricardian equivalence iheorem states ihat the readjustment of
laxes through time with accommodating changes in the stock of
government funds will leave net wealth, and therefore consumption
out of current income, unchanged. Barro [1974] elucidaies the
assumpilons necessary for this tobe the case, and hence, when these
assumptions do foi hold, shows some of the circumstances under
which there will be a nei wealth effect when the governmeni issues
bonds [eds],
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The essence of our approach is fairly simple. We have
linked together nine annual country models of
identical structure, and added equations for the trade
(only) of other countries, divided into three blocks.
Hence the interesting detail relates primarily to the
nine (major OECD) countries.
Each country model has the structure set out in
Minford [1980], to which the reader is referred for
detailed support of the following account. The model
consists of:
an interrelated set of private sector demands foi
stocks of money, government bonds (and net foreign
assets), and durable goods, and for a flow of non-
durable consumption goods; these demands depend
on wealth and real returns;
a government supply function of (narrow Ml)
money which together with the government and
foreign sector budget constraints determines also the
supply of bonds plus foreign assets:
e) efficient financial markets in the operational
sense that expected returns are equated across
domestic and international financial assets;
rational expectations which are implemented
operationally by using the model's forecasts as the
expectations;
the supply of output is modelled via a price
equation derived from an aggregate production
function as a mark-up over costs which varies with the
level of output:
the labour market has a significantly large union
sector; the non-union sector clears continuously (at
levels heavily influenced by social security benefits).
But the union's real wage target is seen as the outcome
of intertemporal maximisation of their members'
incomes and, given adjustment costs in firms' demand
for labour, this gives rise to a union real wage which is
a mark-up over expected non-union real wages and
also dependent on lagged union real wages and firms'
other cost factors. This real wage target is translated
into a one-year nominal wage contract on the basis of
expected inflation. Aggregating together union and
non-union wages and substituting out firms' demand
for labour, we obtain a reduced form real wage
equation positively related to output, lagged real
wages and employer taxes on labour and negatively to
unexpected inflation, benefits and employee taxes.
Hence if there is unanticipated inflation, real wages
fall, and so do output costs, the supply curve of output
therefore shifts outwards temporarily. In subsequent
periods, real wages gradually return to equilibrium
and output with it.6
the current account external balance depends on
the real exchange rate (defined as domestic relative to
foreign consumer prices adjusted for the exchange
This is a Lucas-type supply function which is however derived b a
rather different route from thai chosen by Lucas and Rapping
[1969].
rate) and domestic and foreign 'absorption' (total final
expenditure).
Hence the model's features are predominantly 'New
Classical'. These features distinguish it from available
multi-country models such as Project Link, which
tend to he very large, preserve a traditional Keynesian
approach, and contain a large number of auxiliary
hypotheses besides their Keynesian core. Variation in
the auxiliary hypotheses makes it easy for these
models to rationalise events ev post without jettisoning
that core; but this procedure implies that little of any
interest is being tested in prediction.
From an academic viewpoint our aim is to minimise
the number of auxiliary hypotheses and so make it
possible to test more effectively the core new classical
hypotheses. Ideally, we would want to set up a
'Keynesian' alternative model with a minimum of
auxiliary hypotheses, to compare with ours. However,
at present this lies outside our capability.
The problem much stressed recently in model-building
has been the 'Lucas critique', i.e. that model
parameters may change when policies and other
parameters of the exogenous environment change. In
principle we can avoid this problem by specifying a/l
expectations (and any relevant higher moments)
explicitly. In practice, however, so many enter a model
such as this that modelling economy enforces some
choice of critical expectations to model explicitly,
leaving others to be implicit and so vulnerable to the
critique. Empirical trials should tell us how well our
choices have been made and whether it would pay us
to widen the choice; this is, however, in the nature of
empirical work and does not pose a deep-seated
challenge to our methods.
The model is based on preliminary econometric
estimates using limited information methods.7 Some
parameters have been imposed on the basis of
previous work, when satisfactory estimates could not
be obtained. Full dynamic simulation tests have not
yet been possible. Therefore, viewed empirically the
model is as yet a tentative, essentially untested
construct. Nevertheless, in so far as its structure
reflects a major strand of modern macroeconomic
thinking and its parameters are related to available
empirical work, its simulation properties are of
interest.
Econometric estimation of Structura! equations of an economic
model must take Into account the simultaneous determination of
the system in order to climate estimation bias. Limited information
methods, as the title implies, ut i!ise incomplete information about
the simultaneous system, taking into account the saciables which
enter the rest of the model hut not t he fu!! specitïcaiion of tite other
equations in the model. Other simultaneous estimation methods.
such as three-stage least squares and Full Information Maximum
Likelihood. do take into account the full specification of the model
when individual equations are estimated lcds
The Full World Model
This is a very large model for rational expectations
solution. There are 160 equations and 45 expectational
variables. Experiences of estimating and solving the
UK model, which is just over one tenth the size but is
by now fully operative in forecasting and policy
analysis, has taught us that the coefficients used must
be tightly circumscribed by prior restrictions if the
model is to be capable of generating a 'proper'
solution - i.e. one that lies within a plausible distance
from the equilibrium path. The coefficients that give
most trouble in this respect are the wealth coefficients;
at this stage we have been unable to find a specification
within which free estimation of these gives proper
solutions. These coefficients are largely imposed
theref'ore in the current version, at values that imply
small impact effects (as assumed in our previous
formal discussion).
The annual data, at the level of aggregation we were
using failed also to generate sensible current account
balance equations. The coefficients of these have
accordingly been taken from Beenstock and Minford
[19761, who estimated a comprehensive set of trade
elasticities of plausible size on a consistent basis. The
long-run elasticities on 'competitiveness', which were
estimated via polynominal distributed lags of long
duration (up to six years) have been applied here to the
expecteddeviation from purchasing power parity over
the five years ahead, rather than the lagged values of
this deviation.8
Otherwise the coefficients are freely estimated subject
to these imposed values. (A listing is available from the
author for the equations with their descriptive
statistics, and detailed data and methods.) It must be
stressed that the current versidn is very much an
interim working version, a primitive monster which
we hope will evolve to a better adapted form. To
examine the model's properties, we focus on two
simulations only, albeit important ones, US fiscal and
monetary expansionary surprises.
US Policy Simulations with the Full Model
A once-for-all rise in the US money supply
We begin with that simulation standby - a monetary
shock, i.e. an unanticipated once-for-all rise in the
money supply. Table I shows the signs of the full
model impact effects.
y Changes in economic sanables iflti\ take varying ainouuts o! time
before their full effects are felt. so that the lagged salues of these
variables often appear mn econometric models. Polynomial
distributed lags assume that the distribution of the lag has a
polynomial form in which the squared and higher order teams enter
[eds].
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Table /
Impact effects of US monetary and fiscal shocks
domestic prices
foreign prices
real exchange
rate
domestic real
interest rate
foreign real
interest rate
domestic output
foreign output
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The one sign that is counter-intuitive is on the US real
exchange rate. This rises, instead of falling as one
might expect. The reason turns out to be simple
enough. There is a powerful real interest rate effect in
the model. As world real interest rates fall, the US
demand increases substantially; this exceeds the rise in
supply. But in the rest of the world, the rise in demand
is less thant the rise in supply. Hence the relative price
of US goods (the real exchange rate) rises, that of
goods elsewhere falls.
The particular sign effect may well be a quirk of
relative elasticities, wealth in particular. It cannot be
regarded as robust at this stage. But it is at least
interesting that it should be thrown up by our
parameter values.
At the world level, the simulation offers no real
puzzles. Output expands because there is an
unexpected rise in prices. Once this has occurred,
producers gradually return output to normal.
We now turn to the numbers produced by a two per
cent once-for-all money supply increase. Figure 1
shows selected effects on output, real interest rates,
prices and the real exchange rates. The basic flavour of
the simulation is given by this diagram. World output
rises by 1 '/2 per cent (US by nearly two per cent) on
impact - a large effect for only a two per cent money
supply increase. World (and US) real interest rates fall
one per cent at the long end, but (rather puzzlingly) a
lot less at the short end. World and US prices rise, as
does the US real exchange rate (while others fall on
average).
These are the impact effects. The dynamic path back
to equilibrium turns out (rather unusually among the
simulations) to have a strong cyclical component and
a tendency to converge (monotonically) at around
25 per cent each period (six and a half years to get
within 15 per cent of equilibrium).
US fiscal expansion
We study next a temporary rise (for one year only ) in
the US budget deficit - financed by bonds (i.e. the
money supply is held constant). The impact effects in
the model are shown in Table 1. The counter-intuitive
result is that the output in the US and abroad falls
instead of rising as conventional theories would
indicate. The model also shows that US prices
definitely fall.
The unusual effect on output across the world can be
explained thus: the fiscal expansion raises real interest
rates, conventionally enough as demand for goods
increases; the rise in interest rates also lowers demand
for money but the rise in bonds (and so wealth)
associated with the higher deficit more than offsets
this effect on money demand, so that the net effect is to
increase money demand, lowering prices for given
output. Output therefore falls because of the
unexpected fall in prices.
This is none other than the result first introduced by
Blinder and Solow [1973], whereby wealth effects of
bond financing may be greater on money demand than
on demand for goods, so that more than 100 per cent
crowding out occurs. (They associated this result with
instability, but that does not occur in a rational
expectations context.)
The actual numbers are illustrated for a few main
variables in Figure 2, for a one-year rise in the US
deficit of about one per cent of US GDP. It can be seen
that there is a contraction on impact both on world
and US GDP. There is also a sizeable contraction
(1'/per cent) in ide import volumes because of the
effect on their debt interest of higher world real
interest rates. These real rates in turn rise by nearly one
per cent at the long end and about 1 '/2 per cent at the
short end. This is a substantial effect and it can be seen
that international crowding out (especially of Ides) is
fairly significant.
The US real exchange rate appreciates by nearly
one per cent: about the same as the US real long rate of
interest. When one reflects that the actual US budget
deficit has risen from one per cent of GDP in 1978 to
three per cent in 1980 and 1981, five per cent in 1982
and six per cent in 1983, and that at present there is no
viable plan to reduce it, the scale of the effect on world
real interest rates and on the US real exchange rate of
monetary fiscal
expansion expansion
shock shock
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recent US fiscal policies is suggested - approximately
six times the impact effects of this simulation. Being a
longer-lasting fiscal change, these effects would last
correspondingly longer - in fact in a simulation of the
same shock lasting five years, real world interest rates
stayed up at over one per cent higher for nine years.
When we turn to the dynamic path on this temporary
shock, there is little cyclical component. Convergence
(monotonie again) is a bit more rapid than in the
monetary shock case - about 30 per cent per year.
The recovery of norld output in year two reflects the
fact that there is a strong shock-adjustment effect of
higher real interest rates; in year two this 'unwinds'
giving rise to the moving average process discussed
earlier.
To sum up, this fiscal simulation indicates that US
fiscal expansion does not 'stimulate' the world or the
US economy but mainly causes higher world real
interest rates and a US real appreciation. The
crowding-out that results from higher real interest
rates has a particular impact on Ide's and other major
debtors.
Recent Events and Policy Implications
Based on these simulations, we can hazard an outline
of the reasons for the 1980-82 world recession and the
1983 recovery; we have not yet been able to use the
model formally to track these events but an informal
discussion is possible.
The salient features of the world economy since 1978
can be crudely summarised. World output fell between
1979 and 1982 in a prolonged 'double-bottomed'
recession. It then began - at the end of 1982 a fairly
normal recovery, rapid (as typically occurs) in the US
and sluggish elsewhere (except for the UK whose
recovery began. like its recession, earlier than most
and had gathered some strength by end-1982). World
real interest rates, having been very low for most of the
1970s, rose sharply in 1980 and have remained high
ever since. Inflation rose to a peak in 1980 of over
10 per cent and has since then fallen rapidly, reaching
three per cent in the US in 1983 and 4'/ per cent in the
world.
On the policy side, the US deficit has grown
substantially as a fraction of GDP allowing for
plausible 'cyclical adjustment' does not change that
picture. 1f one takes at face value the determination of
the Federal Reserve Board to hold inflation at
three per cent or so, then given that the deficit is being
financed by nominal bonds of average maturity,
'(prospective) inflation accounting' does not change
the picture significantly either. From the rational
expectations viewpoint, we need to know how much of
this deficit change was unanticipated; my suggestion
would be that it was unanticipated in 1979 but that by
the end of 1980 the expectation of sustained high
deficits under Reagan's policies had become dominant.
US monetary growth, which is essentially independent
of the President in the USA, began to be curbed in
1980 when it fell to 8.6 per cent. This has to be seen
against a rise in inflation to 13.5 per cent (we can think
of inflation as reflecting largely the expected monetary
growth in the previous year). It would have been
reasonable to expect the Fed to allow much faster Ml
growth given the 'needs of trade'. Hence 1 would
suggest that there was a substantial unexpected fall in
Ml growth; In 1981, Ml growth fell further to 5.1 per
cent; again inflation at 10.4 per cent in 1981 suggests
that much of this fall was unanticipated. The same, but
to a lesser extent, was true of 1982 (the low average Ml
figure conceals a very low figure early in the year but a
much higher figure in the second half). Thus there may
have been three successive negative monetary shocks
in a row. The 1983 figure by contrast indicates a strong
positive monetary shock. Ml may have grown by 7
per cent against inflation of three per cent.
According to this interpretation, the rise in world real
interest rates in 1980 was the result of the rise in the US
deficit andthe unexpected fall in US Ml growth. That
world real rates have siaed so high and appear set to
continue that way is due to the sustained high deficits
(for negative monetary shocks gave way to a positive
shock in 1983).
The pattern of growth is to be explained not at all by
fiscal shifts; these were positive in 1980 (and again in
1982) but did not prevent recession in 1980 and
continued recession in 1982. Indeed according to the
model they may have somewhat worsened the
recession (partly by precipitating the Ide debt crisis).
Rather, the recession, its 'double-bottom' and long
duration, are plainly due to the succession of negative
monetary shocks, inspired in turn by the Fed's
determination to get inflation back down to rates last
seen in the 1960s. The recovery process would have
occurred anyway in 1983 according to the model,
provided there was no further negative shock then. It
has, however, been speeded up by a fairly strong
positive monetary shock (related, it seems, to the Fed's
fears for the collapse of the international monetary
system under a major default).
Last, the inflation story can be interpreted as the
successive downgearing of expected monetary growth,
as the Fed's determination and stamina progressively
became apparent. In the US there were no
announcements of long-term targets, only one-year
ones; this lack of long-term commitments was
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Table 2
Recent world events
Treasury Bill Rate (3 months) minus average inflation rate (this assumes that over such a short time horizon expected and actual inflation are equal,
probably not a bad approximation).
2 IFS definition
encouraged by the political system - for example,
mid-term elections to Congress and the Fed
Chairman, Paul Voicker's own reappointment date in
1983 - but it no doubt partly contributed to the
downward-ratchet pattern of expectations.
A 'sharp enduring shock' administered in 1980 and
backed by a complete political commitment would, if
possible - according to the model - have precipitated
a bigger recession in 1980 (it was actually quite mild)
but one that would have ended more quickly and
brought inflation down more rapidly.
In view of the propensity for many economists to cite
'oil factors' as major casual agents over this period, I
should stress that it enters the story here not at all. Oil
is 'just another input commodity' in this model; its
price is a relative price and energy technology is just
one source of technological change. Clearly, shocks to
tastes and technology matter at the micro level and if
sufficiently correlated across industries may matter at
the business cycle level. I feel free to refer to such
correlated shocks as sources of macro shock; but in
this recent episode there is no compelling reason to do
so.
Should US fiscal policy have moved 'in line' with tight
money? This has been the main flashpoint of recent
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US-rest of world policy interchange. The rest of the
world has not welcomed the effect of US government
borrowing in pushing up real interest rates world-
wide. (The logic of tight money has separately been
accepted as necessary for anti-inflation policy.) This
complaint, in the light of the model's interpretation,
has two dimensions. First, there is the dislike of shocks
in themselves; uncertainty is increased - a stable
fiscal policy is to be preferred to an unstable one.
Second, in so far as the rest of the world is a net debtor
to the US (which it is),9 it suffers a rise in its real debt
burden; there is therefore a transfer effect.
Secondly, shocks are as unwelcome in the US as
elsewhere; the fact that a new government felt it
necessary to impose one reveals its judgement that the
need offset the unwelcome effects. Governments, like
private agents, optimise in response to changed
circumstances. One can only speculate on whether it
was truly in the US interest for taxes to be deferred in
this way; the optimal tax pattern over time is discussed
in Barro [1974], who argues from the transactions
costs of changing tax rates that they should be
constant. If this is so, then the issue revolves around
whether government spending projections are for such
° Net overseas assets 01 the US banking system at end-1981
were about £138 bn.
1978 1979 ¡980 1981 1982 1983
Growth in GDP
US 4.7 2.4 -0.3 2.6 -1.9 3.4
OECD 3.9 3.2 1.2 2.0 -0.5 2.2
Inflation (CPI)
US 7.6 11.3 13.5 10.4 6.2 3.2
Industrial countries 7.2 9.1 11.9 9.9 7.5 5.1
Real shorttermt interest rates
US -0.4 -1.3 -1.9 3.7 4.5 5.9
Fiscal and monetary policies
US federal deficit (calendar year) as %
of US GNP
1.7 1.1 2.6 2.7 4.9 7.0
US growth in Ml2 7.3 7.6 8.6 5.1 4.8 9.0
Industries countries growth in Ml2 10.8 9.6 6.5 6.0 6.7 9.5
falls that future tax rates will fall, making it
suboptimal to raise them now.
As far as transfer effects are concerned, such
possibilities are inherent in the signing of debt with
short-term maturities; the debt was voluntary so no
complaint is possible. Nevertheless, a severe transfer
effect on Ides has turned out to be particularly
disruptive - and has forced a shift in US monetary
policy to avoid monetary collapse. In its own interest,
the US needs to take these effects into account,
legitimate as it is to cause them.
A few things the model does imply are:
the more predictability in government policy the
better; shocks and uncertainty cause costs. Therefore,
if the US shift to higher deficits was not internally
justified, it imposed costs on the world by disturbing
plans and in particular raised the variance of output;
planned 'reflation' or 'locomotive' policies will
have their principal effects on inflation and, if fiscal
and bond-financed, on real interest rates; they will not
speed up recovery or end recession;
e) there are a number of ways in which international
feedback rules for monetary and fiscal policy could
'work' to reduce the variance of world output [see
Minford and Peel 1983]; but it is not at all obvious
what values should be given to the feedback
coefficients to improve the stability of the model
relative to its present tolerable level (convergence at
30 per cent p.a.).
d) governments also can optimise individually with
respect to world capital market conditions by
borrowing less at times of high real interest rates; if
they do, the response of world real rates to higher US
borrowing would of course be smaller and so too
would the disturbance to world output.
To sum up, with respect to US policies, the rest of the
world does not appear to have a case for them to
change, other than to point out the effects which the
US authorities may not have taken into account in
designing them. A world government might take a
different view of what US policy should be; but then
we do not have one - and if we did, the rest of the
world would not be free either!
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